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Part I
Defined Benefit and
Defined Contribution
Plans
Chapter 2
A Fresh Look at Defined Benefit Plans:
An Employer Perspective
Marc M. Twinney
This chapter compares we characteristics of defined benefit, defined
conu·ibution. and hybrid plans, and reviews recent trends. particularly
among large plan sponsors. Benefit policies of a set of large employers
are sun'eyed, followed by a discussion of remedies (0 some of the practi-
cal problems faced by defined benefit plans.
~ly \·;ews and observations regarding defined benefit plans arc drav,,:n
from a lifetime as a practitioner in pro\;ding and deli\"ering benefits in
the pn'"ate sector. These views are not abstract theories, nor do the~'
represent ardent ad\·ocacy. \Vhile they have c\"oh"ed from an employer's
perspecti\'e and priorities, the~' also stri"e to seek a balance among com-
pedng viewpoints of employees, plan sponsors, and the public. Ther rec·
ognize the priority of meeting employees' retirement needs in a world
of complex law and custom. where age discrimination in emplo~'ment is
elaborately proscribed and employers cannot mandate an abr1ng em-
ployee's retiremenc
Pension Plan Types and Goals
Three major types of pension plans pro\'ide retirement income: defined
benefit (DB). defined contribution (DCl. and hybrid plans. The ke\· fac-
tOf differentiating the basic types is whether the plan defines a lifetime
benefit or the annual contribution. In a hybrid plan, features of both
basic IJpes are combined, blurring the differences. One such hybrid is
the cash balance plan. wherein each plan participant has an indi\;duaI
account for contributions, but because the plan guarantees a specified
imerest rate on the account as \\'ell as conversion rates for COlllll1ut....uion
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Ln a lifetime hemJll. thl:' pl<lll ;t.')SWllCS the charaucri:-.tics of a defined
bent'fi t plan.
There are sc..·H'ral illlponanr ciitl<"'I"ences between plan t\Ves (see also
Rappaport et al.. t.his volume), In DB and some h~ orid plans, the retiree
benefit Illu:-.I be .'ltatcd in the form of all allnui~- (one that often may be
(:oTlverted to a lump slim I. In 0<: plans as "'ell as some- hybrid plans. the
benefit is ~Tated in the f()rm uf a lump sum (that also rnay he convened
to an anntlit~)" DB beIJef-i{~ arc Il(lrmallv based on pay ,md'-or st'l"'\"ice. In
conU·asl. DC and hybrid aCCOlllH balances normally grow hased fill an-
nual clllplo~:ercOlllributiollS or C1"cdits equal to a percentage of the em-
ployee's pa~". plus earnings on the assets in the account. H~'hrid plans
guarantee the intert'::'ot rate on acC':ount.-.; and/or the annui~-Tate:;.for COll-
versioll 10 lifetilll<:- benefits.
The funding slatus of DB and hyhrid plall~ is detcrmiJlt'd anllariall~',
In other ,,·oni:-.. contribulions arc dettTmillcd based on ac:tual·ial assump-
tions and are designed to prm·ick the promised henefit at retirement.
:\10reO\·el", all the DB plan's asst'"(s stalld behilld all the henefit'i, In a DC
plan. b~ contrast, ron(riblltion~are made to indi,;(ltwl accol1l11S and de-
tennined hy the plan formula; the llSScts in each separate aCCOllnt deter-
mine (he benefit. ln <I hyhrid plan. a "phantom" account is maintained
t()r eacll employee.:. bUlthe LOtal \"(llue of such accounts at any gin::n point
in lime ma~· dif-)(~:r from the trust fund ,·alue (i.e., the plan may bt under-
funded or oH''ffundcd). For this reason. some funding flexibiliry exisL~
ill DB and h~-hl;d plans. whereas the DC plan affords no fkxibili{~ in
funding '\'ilhuut changing the benefit.
The funding differences lranS(;HC into diITer<:-ntial patterns of risk
horne by stakeholders in the plans. Thus the employer hears the pension
plan inveSlment risk and re,,·arcl in a DB plan, whereas in a DC phUl the
emploYt:e bears the investment risk and reward. In the hyhrid plan case,
lht'" sponsoring empll)yer hears plan ilWCSlJllent risk because the em-
ployee rccei\"es a g-uaranteed interest rate 011 his or her aCCOlillt. Of
course. cmplo\·ers can manage and cOIHrol this risk by establishing rea-
sonahlt' interest r~ue p;uarantees..-\ related reasun DC plans are growing
in LlHlr is that the sponsoring employer's costs rend 1.0 be more predict-
able and less ,·olatile that in a DR pension. This diiTerence arises hecause,
in the DB plan. the employer "L..sumes more il1\-cstment and inflation
risk, as ''''ell as more of Ihe turno\"C'I". disabilit~, and monality lisk. than in
a DC pension.
:\.dditional imporra11l differences between plan ~"pcs refer to the em-
ployee's l;ghL~ o\'er tilt" pension prior to retirement. An employee [('1'-
minating emplo~·m(·11l prl0r to retirement eligihili~' is t:lltitlecl to a
deferred vested benctlt thal generall~-does nol change aiter termination
in IJle 1)1) case (in nominal terms). III contrast, in t.he DC and Iwhrid
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case. a terrninaring employee ~'pirallyma~'withdraw the account balance
and roll it o\'er into an Inrthidual Retirement A.ccoum (IRA), .-\ltt'nla·
th'ely the funds may be reilwested elsewhere. In this sellse, DC and hy·
brid plans otTer greater ponahiliry [han their COUIuerpans, On the other
hand, DB pensions (and, «J a lesser extent, hybrid plans) facilit,He dis-
ability, sllrvi\'or, and early retirement benehts because they oftell specit)'
supplementary benefits payable at early ages or on the occasion of death
or invalidit\',
One betor increasingly noted by large employers is that, for equiva-
lent cost 1e\"t~ls. DB plans lend to benefit older. highly paid employees,
Com"ersely, DC and hybrid pensions tend to be mon..' age-ncutral and
often prm"ide higher henefit'i to shan-term employees and people who
change employers. In addition. some companies han' [ound that em-
ployees appreciate DC anrl hybrid plans because their account balances
are quantifiable; the concern is that this appreciation ma~' sometimes
stem from a poor understanding of the size of the acculllulation amount
necessaI~" to prm"ide retirement income, Analysts have found in practice
that a DB plan "ill often have lower cost.~ than DC and hybrid plans. even
assuming equal iJl\'estment r~~ull'" on pension assets. because rhe \'alue
of dcft'rred \'estcd benefits in a defined benefit pension is less than the
\-alue of account balances accumulated in DC or hybrid plans for those
who terminate employment prior to retirement.
Defined Benefit Plan Goals
Academics and practit.ioners ha'"e man~' dleories regarding \...·hy employ-
ers sponsor defined benefit pension plans (Schmitt 1993). For the pres-
ent. discussion. my perspecth-c is that large industrial firms prefer the
defined benefil form as the prilllaI~: plan to meel their retirement obje<.··
ti\'es. The" do so less because of cost efficiency than the effccti\'eness of
this l)Ve of pension in achie'"ing desired o~jeetives, SpeCifically. lhe DB
plan is the most effecti....e human resource mechanism available to re-
11100-C older, less efficient t.'mplo~'ees from the workforce in a humane
and socially responsible \\'ay. In other words. pensions at these large finTIs
are not designed prilllarily LO recruit employees or LO tie core emplo~'ees
tn the workforce so as to a\'oid training costs, The fact that t.hese ad<.li·
t.ional results might occur to a greater extent under a DB pension plan
than \\"ith a DC plan is incidental to the primary goal. These secondary
effecls result frum efforts to control the costs of pro\'irling retirement
income. and arc acceptahle to the finn and to employee~,
III seeking to design sensible compensation offerings. employers nor-
mally start. by measuring the cost/benefit ratios ofaltcrnalh'e packages.
Set.'king to achie\'e their ultimate goal. The costS ll~ual1y con~idered natu·
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rall~- include retirement benefits and the .salary /wages sayed at the point
of cOtllemplated retirement. hut in 111~- expericllce t\Vically do not in-
c1udt., an assessment of recruiting and training costs for replaccmelll
emplovct's. For many firms, replacements are either assumed Ilot to be
required (as in a case where the firm is reducing in size) or are seell as
pan of (he normal attrition and growth process,
Some firms attempt to reduce plan cost IC\-e!s anct benefit levels by
substilllting a DC plan in place of their old DB offering_ This has been
done in insLallces where the newly framed indh'jdual acc-ount appears
more ntluable to younger workers than did the old DB plan's benefits.
"'hich \'vere onh- a\-ailable at a fumre retirement. age, HO\,-ever, the prub-
lem that can arise is that lower retirement benefits deliyercd b~' the DC
plan ma" cause older workers to delay retirement. :\s a conseqll~l1ce. the
effon lO reduce costs may fail. and the finn may 1IItimatel~- pay because
it is <.:umpensating less t'fficient \\'orkers towarrl the end of lheir careers.
.-\ related issue is that a DB plan can deli\'er a particular retirement
hencn.t or income replacemenl ratio with precision, ,,,,-hereas the benefit
to be generated hy a DC accoullt is much less certain and ultimately de-
pends on markeL share yalues or other random factors: that is, an em-
ployer can focus a defined benefit plan's repla<.:ement ,'ario 011 selec£ed
retirement ages or ha,-e lt ma..ximized after a specific period of sen-ice,
This enables the sponsoring finn to ensure orderly retjremcnt planning.
a factor employers find important gh'en legal restrictions O\'cr the em-
ployer's right to terminatc employment selenively, It is likel~- thal orderly
scheduling of retirements O\-er reasonable time horizons makes the finn
more efficient and the organization more energetic.
These defined benefit advantages are demonstrated by comparing
outcomes under DC and DB plan types for a gi,'en date, such as the year
of normal retirement. which is when an employ~r intends retirement to
occur and the pension benefit is paid withoul reduction, Under a de-
fined benefit pension. if retircm~11l is postponed a year. no benefit is
paid, Thc plan savcs b~- retaining that benefit as well as the plan's inYesl-
ment income for the year. hut subsequently another year's sen;ce and
pay incre.tse l11a,- he charged_ In my experience, these benefh sa\ings
lend lO balance out in large-emplo\'er DB plans,
By conrrast, in a defincd contribution plan the employer sees no sav-
ings ,,'hen an emplo~'ee postpones retirement one year because the em-
ployee retains both the benefit nun payment and the investment return,
A_s a resulL the defined contributiun plan creates no incentive to retire
at any specific point of time. If the employer has evidence to belie\-e that
afler a certain age employee producti\it)" does not lmprm-e (or is in fact
declining), the defined benefit cost pattern is more efficienL This \iew
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assumes prodncri\-iry as a fanor in tht:' prO\;sion of benetil"i in a competi-
tive pay package.
A Brief Review of Trends
The rrends in cm-eragc and benefits han: been sUfH'yed and \\'ell re-
poned during the last the ~-ears (Schit:'bcr 1993. Olin'r and Patterson
19~J~-95). .\1y perspeCli\-e on tht:'st:' findings is that pri\"ate pension plan
coverage is not n:ry high (only abour ':>0 percent or so), given the
20 ~"ears since ERISA. One must be careful \"irh this point as (here are
sizable differences in (overage reported by different sources. There is
good n;dence, for instance, that audited tax returns prm-ide more ac-
curate tallies ofpensioll participation than does the Current Population
Sun;ey (CPS) ba.lled on inlcf\"iews of individuals. This difference in re-
poning is huge. on the order of one out. of three or 33 percent. in some
series_ ="1"0 doubt indi\-iduals' recollection of Iheir co"el-age is not ycry
accurate. perhaps ber3nse people arc unaware or forgetful of being em'-
ered or are confused berween pension cO\-erag~. pension eligihili~", and
pension vesting.
Despite ulese ca,·eats, the numher of defined benefit plans (and DB
participants) has declined in the Cniterl States in recenr years, whereas
the number of defined contribution plans (and plan participants) has
increased_ L!sc of the DB pension has dropped less among large employ-
tTS, but eyen among Ihese large employers employment has declined as
they "righl-sizerr' and suught to irnpron:' prodllctiYity. [n some indus-
l,ries these transitions haye been suhstantial; for example, at Ford ~lotor
Company. it took rwen'0'-fh-e yean for the workforce to double between
the mid-1950s to the end of the 1970s, bur less than five years for em-
ployment to be ClIt in half cturing the rf'cession of 1979-1982_
To a.ssess ,-cr:" recent trends among large employers, r undertook a
limited sun:ey of the pension outlook at lwenty companies in 199:>.
\·,"hilt' this is adminedly a small sample, these are \'ery large finns, among
the largest in their lines of business_ Though specific compan~· names
cannot be re'"ealed for confidentiality reasons. the companies are prin-
cipally in manufacturing: no more than two firms come from the same
industry·. The industries represenled are automotiye, chemical. com-
munications. dnlg, e1ecuical,:elecuonies, metals. oil. retailing, tire, and
en~rgy.
To summarize my Hndings, there was little evidence of rcn:n( massl,·e
change in the pension offerings of these twenty companies. This was in
pan true because most of rht:' respondents had bOlh DC and DB plans;
only one company relied exdllsiYely on a DC to provide retirement il1-
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corne. I Of the group. three quarters. or fifteen of the r"..·enn', had re-
viewed their pension policy hetween 1990 and 1994; of these fifteen.
seven made changes during that time, six made no change. and (WO arc
still considering their options.
Three companies increased the DC contributiun while one decreased
its DC contribution during this period. One company increased the DB
benefit (to remove a competiti\T~ deficiency) and two companies de-
creaserl the DB henefit. for future stTYice but not for prior sen-icc (nei-
ther of these eliminated the DB plan. hOWC\Tr). Only one finn (included
in the counts aboH-') both increased its DC and decreased it" DB plan.
Two other companies continue lo explore a possihle shift of emphasis to
the DC from the DB plan.
These counts overlook changes in benefits for negotiated gruups as
well as special early re.tirement ,\indows..-\t le,lljt half the companies in-
creased their negotiated benefiL'; at least once during the five-year p<.>
riod. If these 10 DB increases are netted against the one DB decrease,
the result is a net positive of nine increases.
Several possible causes for switching from DB to DC plans have been
offered at the national kn·t. prominent among them regulation and its
unpredictability (Clark and ~1cDermed 1990). In many employers' "iew,
this regulator} complexity and instability has been increased by the en-
actment of the 1994 Retirement Protection Act, whose goal is to reduce
private DB pension plan llnderfunding by making more \'olatile the pre-
miums payable to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. a~ com-
pared to prior 1m..... It is my considered opinion that these increased
premiums will do less to improve fUilding than , ....·ill increased employer
contributions along \\ith the continued shift away h'om the DB pensions.
The future does not bode well for those concerned with the broad goals
of coverage and participation in pension plans guaranteeing income for
life after retirement.
Employers' Retirement Income Policies
If the changing array of plans and coverages has been less e\ident among
larger employers, it is nevertheless wonh\....·hile to determine what poli-
cies they have followed. This sectiun investigates the policies thcsL' large
employers have followed "ith respect to providing cash retirement in-
come and how they have thought about the differences between defined
henefit plans and the alt.ernatives.
The survey of twenty large plan sponsors suggests nve differenr ap-
proaches to prodding pension income, approaches followed b~- more
than one company. These policies appear in Table 1, and may be classi-
fied as follows. First. we identified a focus on '·cmployce security."
TABU:: I Survey of Larg:e Pri\<il(' St"Clor Emplo}'t'rs' RelircOlt"IlI LncoJ~c.· PnliciC:i
E1lIplo.\"l't St-mri('i
Compiul~'A receml~' re\;e\'·l'd its empluymelll ~c.:Hri[v polic\ ...\fter doing so. it
reatlirmt'd ,hal a!ong-(cnn rdalionship hel\\'{'en (Ii(' finn and iL't core em-
ployees hascd on concern for the emplm'ces' security needs was in the COIll-
pan(~ bcs( imerc'l[, and th:.u the benefit plan::! ~hOllld support that nhjccu\'e,
Thus Company A did not shift from a ddil1('(! hem'fit to a ctdi.ne.ct contribu-
tion phtn simply to make it ca:,ier for employee, to lean'. 01-10 enable Com·
pany A to terminate rel<tljonship'" more simply. Here the appro:!rh \\'30<;' not
one of ··\\.-here s.hould fetirement income come from'· bUl radl(:r one of
··are cun'cm lxndit pl'lIls consistent \\;th compall~ cmploHm'1H St.'curity
objectives..-
Compptiti011
Company B has a '·mctr'kC{-relilu:cr' policy of prmiding bCllefit lcn:'l~ and t~ve1'
has~d fin competiti'"C' Slln"ey1' for Compan~'B" The market of comparators is
made up of leaning- L-Ilited Stat~s companies in dilTer~lll indll~tri~.., (other
compani~slise the finns in tlu:'ir indus(f) J. For re-liren)cnt incollle and other
post-rc.'liremeul henefit.s of non-represented employees, Compi-lIl\' B's o~iec·
tilT i~ to prmirle appruximateh'100 percent ofa bendit Y3111t' index fnr each
t~pe ofhenefll and by benefit ~eC[or. Other compLlnies using (he iudex can
select the comparators and the perct'lllages. When belletl( changt'$ are made.
the goal is to move closer (0 the pcrct'IlI.1ge objeCli\'c ","here possible, h~" in-
creases and det:rea:ies in bendits. n\llen acUustrnents are. made for the down-
ward cfTt'ct on the index of reflect.ing changes to conform to tht" 1986 Tax
Reform An, thert' ha~ been almo!'illlo change in the \'alue of the defined
benefit or the defined contribution plan indices during-lhe lasl fiv<' \'ears.)
l11fer1l0/ Equil)
Company C ha.. cvoln"d it policy of providing beJlefiL'i thm are "emplo~n)ent
neuu'al" across demographic facLOrs such as age, senice. gender. and depen-
dents. The firm'~ nhjecti\'e is for benefils (0 \'al~- b~' merit and peliormance
per unit of work in a wa\" comparable \\'ith (:nmpcnsation" ft does not \\ish to
scc the bt:ncfit plans dominate an empln)'cc's decision to stay or leavc at any
particular poi Ill. To the extelH possible. it does nOt wam demogr:ilphic.:s to al-
locate employer- dollars. It expecls dlC bellefit plans to influence lleither enl·
ployee loyaJ~' nor the oblig-.ltion of (he firm to the employee.
!)rsi,rd Behm..iu,-
Compi-Hl\' 0 seeks to a1j~n emplo~'eebehavior \"ith company goals ofgenerating
wealth, This is accomplished by placing- primary empha'iis on stockholder
value and the emplo~ce in the position ofa stockholder. The theme domi~
nates thc determinacion of contribut.ions to benefa plans, the allocation
of contribution:- among emplo~"e{>:" and the form of the benenl. especiall:
in I-eriremem income secllril~',which is vicwed ,tS JUSt anolher aspen ot
compcl1s'llion.
J:'mpIQyep Choire
CompanY E reC{~ntl~' del-eloped a policy to allow mon: choin' b~- each employee
in designing his/her own bt'lldit package. Some mininHun cm-crages arc- re-
quired and the first choins derive from changes 10 the preexisting program.
The ft'tiremem plans (rash or health) or savings plan were nol included in
the first scrie~ of choices, but arc expecteci to be in\"olved in the IIt'St series,
Thi.~ change will lead to more ernphasi:- of thc defin{~d colltriblll.ioll
approa~:I_,_. _
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the traditional cOllcern of the employer to meet the emplovee's security
needs. Second. we found much discussion of "competition," that is, a
drive to make benefits competitive with other companies as measured by
a market sUITer or a benefit ,-alne index (much as employers match com-
petitiye salary le\"els). A third theme was "internal equity," where com-
panies used benefit forms and yalue scales to allocate benefit accruals in
relation to units of pay. fourth, \ve found thai some firms emphasized
"desired behayior" in that they designed their pensions to encourage
specific types of employee heh~l\ior. Last, some companies emphasized
"employee choice." '~'anting to allow employee participation in the allo-
cation of their OW11 indi\idual benefit packages.
In each case, the employer's concern about retiree benefit'i clearl~
extends more broadly than just derisions between DB and DC plans.
Strategic benefIts dccisionmaking for the next decade \\i11 therefore in-
eyitably involye more complex problems than previously. Specifically: the
pension choice must be made against the backdrop of an evolving- divi-
sion of responsibility among the employer. the worker. and the gm'ern-
ment; the need for lifetime income versus access to accumulated wealth;
retiremen t replacement ratios; provisions for suni\·ing spouses: whether
pensions are offered for early leavers: how disability is treated; and vari-
. ,
ous macroeconomic factors including inflation and produet.i\ity growth.
Suggested Remedies
There are several specific policies that could begin to remedy some of
the problems confronting dt'fined benefit pension plans in the Cnited
States. I begin from the perspective that, for many employers and firms.
combined DB,/DC plans would be preferable to one dominated by DC
plans alone. ~ty list of proposed changes is not exhaustive and, giyen the
need to ayoid further destabilizing the qualified plan system, ayoids dras-
tic medicine.
Refining Pension Regulation
One regulatory change that would be most beneficial would be to re\isit
the rule"') allowing the amount of lump sums to be paid upon retirement
from qualified plans. Current!v man~'workers and retirees can take all of
their accumulated amonnts on term.ination (or retirement) in the form
of a IUlllp sum. Perhaps a better system would permit only half, or per-
haps one-quarter, of the pension assets to be taken as a lump sum. A 11fe
income payment would protect better against the risk of longe\'ity and
\\"ould help assure that payments would continue during the life of the
retired employee, as well as cO\-eTing the sun:iying spollse. \Vith growth
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ill life expectancies. this is a \ital concern. Similarh', pension withdra\'\'als
and loans should he grcatl~· curtailed.
Ifwe are ("urther to restrin lump sums in DB plans. Ihen: is a parallel
question of\'\'hether a DC account should be required 10 be taken as an
annuity (or o\'er the full lifetime with expectancy installments). It seems
illogical to consider the incii\idual account an adequate substitute for
the DB plan \dt.hout requiring that a portion of it he paid for life ..\ more
complex: but in my \iew more just. requirement \\'ould be that an em-
ployer should designate a pension plan l.hal is to be termed the hase or
life income plan. and then ""Quid require that base plan to meet the
50 percent or 75 percent life income \'alue requircmenr (including So-
cial Sccurily benefits, most probably), Likewise, a base plan should not
be allowed to prO\ide wilhrlrawals or loans prior LO retirement and the
cummencemenl of the hfelimc payments (with or without hardship). In
a world of diverse plans thaI the gO\"enllnent htl,'} so willingly combined
for benetltlimitation and teLX purposes. some notion of a minimum life-
time pension could apply,
Another proposal would be to harmonize the age anct senic:e rules
berween defined benefit and defined conuibuliol1 plans_ Because ser·
\'ice lules are much more elabor.He for DB plans (panicularly for breaks
111 sen-ice). employers ha\'e found that it is \irtuall~' impossible 10 run
both plan rypes for the same group of employees \\ith one set of service
niles, For exanlple, in a DB pension. all lhe employee's sen'ice except
for breaks in scn;ce must be taken infO accounl for delermining rhe
worker's nonforfeitable benefit. percentage. However, rules describing a
break in sen'ice vary depending on wherher there was at least one year's
sen,ice prior I.<) the break. Current regulatory pracr.ice states that seryin:,
before a break is not required to be counted for vesting. In rn~· dew, this
fonn of regulatory micro·l11anagement should be eliminated.
A further change would be to allow a one-lime change in pension plan
normal retirement ages to bring them into alignmt'"1lI \dth Social Secu-
rity nIles, as amended. In 1983, Social Security's "nonnal" bcnefh age
,,-as raised. ann further age changes are being discussed (see Gr.tmlich.
this \.'olume). The regulation has \'astly dilTcn:nl eRects on Ihe two differ-
ent lypes of plans, Initiall~·, DB plans were required by ERISA 10 treat age
65 as the normal age at which unreduced henefit~ must be pald, Recent
legislation allowed a higher age for DB. but did not change the age for
existing accruals and further required the higher age fix steppecl·up
benefit... on comptIlsalion over the Sodal Security tax hase. This dis-
torted pension plan early retirement reductions as w{'11 as the pension
'yslem's definition of the "normal" retiremenr age. The rule should be
changed to permit, bm not require, alterations in the plan's nonllal and
e-arly retin:ment. ages as well as reduction fanors for ac<:rued benefits,
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Ot.herwise. a privatt' plan is lock~d into a normal age 6S or a second plan
must he- created. one that pa~-s pan of the benefits at a~e 65 and further
benefits at the Social Security age_ Similarly, a remedy should be found
for DB plans' past accruals that \\:ould allow sume flexibility for the plan
sponsor ro adjust the normal retirement age and share the benefir/co5t
effects with the participanlli. This \\'ouIrL a\-oid penalizing one type of
plan (the DB) in lamr of the other.
In order to achieve system soh-enc~' there may be further changes
in Social Security's normal and early retirement ages_ These proposals
would therefore affect private plans thltt supplement Social Security,
Here it is critical to giye employers sufficient. advance llotice, and a clear
explanation of\\'hat is to be dOllt', to ensure long-term stability of retire-
ment planning. [t \\'ould be ill the interest of national policy as wel1 as of
employers and emplo~'ecs LO allm...· age changes in p,ivate plans. This
would encourap;e more employees \·..ho arc ahle to continue to work to
the full Social Secwity age to do so-
Other changes many large emplo~'ersmight support. would he to in-
crease the annual benefit limit for DB plans to 100 percent of the CO\'-
ered compensat.ion limit (currently LS 5150,000). This would make the
defined benefit limit five times, not four times, the limit on annual DC
contributions. This is essential to restore the relationship initiaHy estab-
lished under ERISA and would begin LO "enecL the underlying relation
between Costs/contribution and benefits \-alues under the two types of
plans. As an alternath'e suggestion. it might be possible to allow DB bene-
fits LO be provided under a nondiscriminatory plan. funded in a separate
trust without tax deduction to the employer llIail benefits were paid, but
with tax exemption on trust earnings, FlCA taxation on the contrihu-
tions "'hen made. but deferral of other taxation to the employee until
benefits \\-ere paid. This restructuring might make employers \\;Iling to
delh'er more \ia lax-<Jualified plan benefits. without the up-front ta..x loss,
Adjusting the Restrictions on Funding
l'nder the ruhric of funding anrl contribution requiremenLlj,/limits. a
suggestion on employee conu'ibutions seems eminently sensible. Specifi-
cally, th<: idea would be to allow tax-exempt employee contributions to
DB plans in amounts up to the same limits for 401 (k) cont.ributions. A
trend has heen fostered in the private senor away from contributo[~:pen-
sions because, at present. employee contributions to pension plans are
always deposited after ha\ing paid income tax, There is no logical policy
reason to discriminate in this way against the DB phm. an issue that gains
in importance because of lhe need for employee cost shltring and em-
ployee choice in the future, (The limitation could apply to each plan
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indi\idllally and to the total addition to both lypes of plans.) This pro-
posal would make cash balance pension plans \,,'ith their automatic life
ilKomc prodsion more competiti\'e ,,;th other DC plans.
The 199-1 Retirement Protection Act made drastic chang-es in mini-
mum funding for DB plans. It increased the funding target for the plans
by mandating iIHerest and mortality standards not based on experience
but baseo on s<:lened standards. The 1993 Tax Act cut back the funding
allowed for pri\'ate plans. :\'either act helped plan sponsors lO fund their
plans by a I-eg-ular and orderly schedule ofcontribmions. One suggestion
that might help deal with these consequences would be to increase the
annual limit 011 the employer's ma.ximum funding that wa"~ deductible.
which could be done by allowing defined benefit plans to project fl1mre
inflation in rhe compensation considered in the benefits in rhe current
year"s maximum funding (at a minimum). Beginning in 1994, the maxi-
mum amount of pJy mat may be considered in detennining a defined
benefit for funding in the plan year was cut from US S235.840 to LS
$1'::'0,000. \\11ile the new limit sounds large. it is inadequate \'I.'hen infla-
tion and pay growth are considered. Indexing the limit in future years
does not help this year's actuarial calculation. Thus employees who
canl as little as lIS 550,000 today and recei\'e pay increases only slightly
greater than innation will not be able to have their benefit funded prior
to retirement.
Another idea h'ould he to increase the maximum funding limit for
non-paywrelated benefits from 100 percent of the current liability by
permitting projection of historic benefit increases. but not in excess of
125 percent. of (he current liability. Consequcnt]~' sponsors of f1ar-rate
benefit plans would be permitted to continue to conu'ibute to mose
plans, even when the funding ratio approachect or exceeded 100 per-
cent. and to build a reasonable cushion for pel;ods of adverse ex-
pCflcncc .
.\lany pension experts ha\'e called for increasing the alternative fundw
ing maximum for pay-related benefits from 150 percent to 175 percent.
which \,,'ould allow sponsors of final-pay fonnulas with young, shon-
service workforces and few retirees to conuibute on a more le\'el basis
with respect to pa~Toll. This would be helpful to nev,,' businesses. includ-
ing employees hired by new plants staned by L"nited States or toreign
companies. Like\\;se, it would be useful to increase or eliminate the
2S percenl payroll limitation for aggregate contributions to OB and DC
plans of the same sponsor. when the cOlllributions meet indi\idual plan
limits. The 25 percent limit is an old rule created to avoid eyasion of
excess profit taxes during "'orld ,·rar II and makes little sense in the cur-
rent context of high minimum requirements. variable pay, and \'olatile
markets. Remoyal of the rule would help sponsors \\ith mature work-
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forces \\'hose minimum requirements fur DB plans can be quite large in
a gi\'en year. The size of Ihe contribution will be {'\'en more unpredict-
able because the 1994 law requires contributions of 90 percent of the
increase in Ihe underfunded current liability (w 3\-"oid harshel- require-
ments) or 30 percent of the aggregate unfunded ClIITClH liability. includ~
ing increased underfunding from drops in interest rateS and declines in
securil)' markets.
finally. actuaries tend to agree that a reasonable monality forecast is
required for DR plans. one that is more reOecti\"e of their own experi-
ence than as the one required under current rules, Large tlnns ha\'e a
more open, more diverse. and larger pool of lives than those used for
the group annuity business, \Ye need w avoid including the selling and
profit margins, as well as the mortality selection. in establishing an accu-
rate basis appropriate fOT these larger employee groups, \Ire also need to
understand lhe unncCeSSaI} margins that can be built into projected
mortality which helps commercial annuities statt:' a higher interest rale
in the annuit\" basis.
Conclusion
h would he ideal if a ne\,' pn"ate retirement system could be designed
from scratch, I suspect that parts of an ideal system '\'ould look quite
different from what we have todar e\'en if we did not choose new goals.
If we did sdeCl flew goals, we would probably wanl rather more em-
phasis on adequacy and singleness of purpose for DC plans and less cum-
bersome and cumplex rules for OB plans. The la~'ers of DB regulation
were ctesigned \\irh the best of intentions, but their result has been
self-<lefeating and must be seriousl~' questioned. Because the cosLo;; and
liabilities are so high. employers' moti\"iltion to prm'ide for adequate re-
placemem income is more fragile than many polic\'makers assume.
Initially. the reglllaLo~' syslem's goals were to foster DB cO\'erage, to
accrue benefits more proportionally with sen-ice. to "est benefits earlier.
1.0 require higher funding, and to guaramee benefits againsl all risks,
including plan termination, The outcome of these mandates seeking
pelfection for the tax-qualified plan system has been perverse o\"erall.
because it has discouraged DB cO\'erage and led to smaller DB benefits
as well a.s more non-qualified DB benefits. The laller oUicomc is the most
ironic hecause in non--qualifiecl plans. vesting, funding, and benefil guar-
antees (the goals of all the reforms) are nonexislelH, This is not solely an
issue rele\'ant to the highl~' paid worker; rather, thousands of emplo~'ees
are being affected toda~' at bmh large and small companies.
\Ieam"'hile, in other parts of the de\"e1oped world, there is a wide-
spread perception that funding or plan termination is not a serions prob-
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lem, Germany's pri\'afe plans are more thall 50 percent unfunded, yet
110 alarm ensues (see Bodie, \fiLchell, and Turner 1996): in cOOtnlS(, in
the L-niLed States, a llnfllnding of less than 5 percent brought on the
,,'orSl kind of crisis predictions in \Vashington, In Britain. plan sponsors
call COlllribute on an orrierly, long-term basis without short-term inter-
ruptions imposed hecause funds hit legal fuB funding hmiL<ii. \\ny is the
llnited States gm'ernfnem alone among western democracies in hadng
hecome so distrustful of private plans and their sponsors~The rules and
tax Jd\'antages ,,,,ert" designed to foster private plans. at Icast initially.
\"'h~' is it now a bad outcome that employers prO\;de benefiL'i according
ro their objectiycs ann policies? \\by should savings and its pri\'ate in-
n:~stment have such a 1m,' public pliority?
On both sides, there is a greater need to appeal Lo the people r~spon­
,;ible for seuing and appl~;ng public policy. The government must begin
to realign its policy goals, ro become more supponi\'c of pT;\'ale plan
sponsors, and to help the pri\"ate sector pro\idc reasonable financial pro-
t.ection for old age, L'nless we develop an endronment conducive to pri-
\'atc pension plans, the nation's retlrement system will remain in sorr'\"
",hape, Social Security is not solvent in the medium and long run, and
benefits are more likely to be cut gradually than are taxes to be in-
crt>ased. 4..\ll this implies. in mr \-iew, that it is time fOl- experts and polit:y-
l1Iakersjointly to seek national solutions to a problem we ha\:e little time
to ~nh'e_
The \·ic,...·s reponed ht':rcin reflect the author's opinion and not the
"iews of his former employer.
Note
I, These results CO\'cr each Hml's.largest cmplo~'eegroup and may exclude or
include negotiated benefits for a pan of the group,
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